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Keynote Address  
The Pattern of Union Decline, Economic 
and Political Consequences, and the 
Puzzle of a Legislative Response 
Craig Becker†
I want to thank the Law Review for sponsoring this sympo-
sium, particularly Matt Norris for bringing together such an in-
teresting group for you to listen to today. Like the Dean, it’s a 
particular pleasure for me to appear on this program with my 
own labor law professor, Jack Getman. I was going to go back 
and check my transcript to see what grade I got in Jack’s class 
so I could encourage the law students in attendance today that 
despite the fact you don’t get all As in law school, you can have 
a moderately successful career as a lawyer. But I’ve moved so 
many times since then that I couldn’t find the box, so the evi-
dence is lost, I’m afraid. 
 
What I want to do today is take the long view on our ques-
tion. Our question for today is the future of organized labor, 
and I want to try to put that question in context. I may perhaps 
raise more questions than I answer, but I’ll leave the answers 
to my esteemed colleagues who will follow after me. Figure 1 
represents the long view as presented by Richard Freeman in a 
really fascinating 1998 article called Spurts in Union 
Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes. And what it 
shows, quite starkly, is that the labor movement you all know 
today burst into existence in a one-, basically two-decade long 
period in the 1930s, 1940s, and the very early 1950s. 
 
†  Craig Becker is General Counsel to the American Federation of Labor 
& Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). Before assuming that po-
sition, he served as a Member of the National Labor Relations Board. He re-
ceived a J.D. from Yale Law School in 1981 and a B.A. from Yale College in 
1978. Copyright © 2014 by Craig Becker. 
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In 1935, of course, the National Labor Relations Act was 
passed. In 1937 alone, U.S. unions grew by 55%, 55% in a sin- 
gle year. But what Professor Freeman’s graph also shows is 
that after that extraordinary spurt, those same unions have 
been gradually, much more gradually, taken apart piece by 
piece since the early 1950s. 
In 1953, union density reached its peak. In 1979, the abso-
lute number of union members reached its peak. So density, 
that is, the percentage of members in the workforce, has been 
in decline since 1953, and the absolute number of union mem-
bers in the United States has been in decline since 1979. The 
decline slowed somewhat in the quarter century after 1959, 
when approximately half the states adopted a “little” National 
Labor Relations Act governing the public sector. For approxi-
mately a twenty-five-year period, public-sector membership in-
creased and slowed the decline in absolute membership by off-
setting the decline in private-sector membership.  
But last year, only two years after an important event—the 
first time that public-sector membership in absolute terms ex-
Fig. 1 Richard B. Freeman, Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and 
Social Processes, in THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE 
AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 265, 266 (Michael D. Bordo, 
Claudia Goldin & Eugene N. White eds., 1998). Used with permission. 
 
 ceeded private-sector membership—public-sector membership 
began to fall. That is, 2010 was the first year where most union 
members in the United States were government employees as 
opposed to private-sector employees. Two years later, in 2012, 
public-sector membership began to decline as private-sector 
membership had been doing for several decades. That was ob-
viously caused somewhat by the recession, but also, of course, 
by a very sharp and direct attack on the rights of public-sector 
workers. The latter was, in turn, I would argue, caused largely 
by the decline in density in the private sector.  
So why does this matter? This is a fairly familiar story, 
although represented here in fairly stark terms. Why does it 
matter? Why should we care about it? Since I only have thirty 
minutes and not three days to answer that question, I’m going 
to focus on just two reasons—economic and political. Economi-
cally, from the point of the peak of that spurt, or actually 
slightly before that spurt in union membership, up through the 
1970s, when private-sector membership began to decline dra-
matically in this country, wages and productivity were closely 
linked as shown in Figure 2. That is, as workers were more 
productive, their wages increased.  
And what’s happened since then, since 1979—when in ab-
solute terms union membership began to decline, and after the 
1970s witnessed the most dramatic drop in private-sector union 
members—is you see that the two have become detached. That 
is, productivity and wages have become detached as Figure 2 
illustrates. American workers continue to be more productive, 
that’s the green line, but wages have basically been flat, that’s 
the blue line. The obvious result is the wealth has gone to the 
wealthiest. So if you want to understand the reasons for the 
explosion of inequality in this country, there are many, but 
Fig. 2 Dave Gilson & Carolyn Perot, It’s the Inequality, Stupid, MOTHER 
JONES, Mar./Apr. 2011, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/02/ 
income-inequality-in-america-chart-graph. Used with permission. 
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here’s a very important one.  
Wages have become detached from productivity, and the 
wealth that’s being increasingly produced is going to a smaller 
and smaller group of people. Let me give you the numbers 
there. Since 1979, the median worker received a 5% raise, 
while productivity has increased by 75%. So where is the 
wealth going? That’s the red line. The American middle class is 
celebrated by politicians, Democratic and Republican alike, but 
that middle class was essentially built by those unions that ex-
ploded into existence in that two-decade period between 1933 
and 1953—United Auto Workers, the United Steel Workers, 
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. All the 
unions that we know today created that celebrated middle 
class, and as those unions have been taken apart, so has the 
middle class.  
So Figure 3 shows you just the correlation, which is obvi-
ously not causality, but it’s still informative, the correlation of 
union membership in percentage terms and the aggregate 
share of income going to the middle class from the late 1960s to 
2009. You see almost a perfect correlation between the drop in 
union membership and the share of income going to the middle 
class. In other words, what we see is that unions, labor organi-
zations, played a decisive role in civilizing and, even more im-
portantly, spreading the benefits of industrialization and mass 
production.  
We celebrate not only the middle class but also manufac-
turing jobs, but it’s important to remember that manufacturing 
jobs, when they first were created, were not the good jobs that 
we think of them as today. They were dirty, dangerous, low 
paid and in many cases segregated jobs, and it’s labor organiza-
tions that civilized those jobs, which spread the benefits of the 
productivity of mass production and made those good jobs. The 
problem today, given the trend lines you see, is that labor or-
ganizations are not playing a similar role in the sectors that are 
expanding today—the service and retail sectors, or in what re-
mains of the manufacturing sector.  
 So let me turn to the political consequences. The weaken-
ing of organizations of working people has not only thrown our 
economy out of balance, it’s thrown our political system out of 
balance. Figure 4 is a graphic depiction of spending in elections, 
with the top line being business, the bottom line being labor, 
and the line just above that being other ideological groups. 
What you see is that business spending is fifteen times that of 
unions, and the gap is widening over time, for obvious reasons. 
There actually always has been a disbalance in spending, but 
there was a time when business spending was at least coun-
tered by union members knocking on doors and talking to their 
neighbors. But fewer union members means fewer doors 
knocked on and the increasing influence of those thirty-second 
attack ads we’re all so fond of on television in September, Octo-
ber and November.  
After Election Day, business spends more than sixty times 
what labor spends and seventy-five times nonprofit spending, 
employing 15,000 lobbyists. So the disparate political influence 
is not only on Election Day, but, perhaps even more important-
ly, after Election Day. And the gap in spending is not only wid-
ening, but it’s true of contributions to both Democrats and Re-
publicans. Disparate spending by business and labor is not a 
party matter.  
Now, campaign finance law, and thus the Supreme Court’s 
campaign finance jurisprudence, traditionally has linked 
treatment of corporations and treatment of unions. Setting 
Fig. 3 Used with permission. 
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aside the important question of whether a corporation, in the 
words of former Chief Justice John Marshall “an artificial be-
ing, invisible, intangible and existing only in contemplation of 
law,” should have First Amendment rights equal to an associa-
tion of people governed by democratic rules, i.e. a labor organi-
zation.  
Setting aside that question,  I think the more important 
question at the moment, post Citizens United, is what are the 
consequences for our democracy of equating corporations and 
labor organizations when the law has very effectively fostered 
the former but, as the graphs above dramatically show, has not 
effectively fostered the latter? So the Supreme Court now has 
told us we can’t, or told Congress that it can’t, address the prob-
lem of the increasing influence of money on politics ex post, af-
ter the fact. So we have to address it ex ante, before the fact. 
And one important way to think about it is that the law needs 
to foster and truly protect organizations composed of people, 
real people, that is, unions, that increase the participation of 
working people, that pool their resources and amplify their 
voices in the political process.  
But there is the stark challenge. The stark challenge is 
how do you put together these two pieces of what I’ve been talk-
Business 
Other 
Ideological 
Labor 
Fig. 4 Business-Labor-Ideology Split in PAC & Individual Donations, CENTER 
FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/blio.php (last vis-
ited April 1, 2014). Used with permission. 
 ing about, that is the increasing need, economically and politi-
cally, for vigorous organizations of working people, and the re-
ality displayed in Figure 4, because this political reality doesn’t 
look very promising. That is, how do we imagine reinvigorating 
the labor movement and reinvigorating our labor law when the 
political reality is that organizations of working people are be-
coming weaker and weaker and corporate, business organiza-
tions are becoming stronger and stronger in the political pro-
cess? And you can illustrate the challenge by looking at the 
states.  
Just before the dawn of the New Deal, Justice Brandeis 
wrote in New State Ice v. Liebmann, that the states are labora-
tories of democracy, but here we can think about them a little 
bit as barometers, barometers that are registering a political 
change prior to the federal government, given the barriers to 
change at the federal level are much greater. So I want to talk 
about the states in two respects. First, I want you to consider 
the correlation between private-sector union membership and 
public employee rights. Twenty-six states have passed “little” 
Wagner Acts governing most public-sector employees within 
their borders, and they did so in a period that correlates almost 
exactly with the period between the peak in union density in 
1953 and the peak in the absolute number of union members in 
1979.  
The peak in union density nationwide occurred in 1953, 
and in 1959, Wisconsin passed the first comprehensive public- 
sector collective bargaining law. The peak of union membership 
in absolute numbers was 1979, and in 1983, Ohio was the last 
state to pass a comprehensive public-sector collective bargain-
ing law. Now, there’s been considerable legislative tinkering on 
both sides of the borders of those states that have comprehen-
sive public sector collective bargaining laws, and some changes 
at the border, but essentially since 1983 that map has stayed 
the same, those states that have public-sector collective bar-
gaining and those states that do not, until the last couple years.  
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Figure 5 shows you what happened as a result. It shows you 
private-sector density since the 1970s up through 2009 and 
public-sector density. During that period when those laws were 
passed, public sector density rose as private-sector density was 
falling and so, as I said earlier, overall the fall in union density 
was moderated as an aggregate matter. But in 2010, as I said, 
for the first time, most union members in the United States be-
came public employees, and two years later, as you all know, 
Wisconsin gutted its public sector bargaining law. So what does 
that tell us? In 1959, when Wisconsin passed its law, union 
density in that state was close to 40%. In 2011, when Governor 
Walker and the Republican legislature gutted the historic law, 
union density was at 7%.  
So this is not a sustainable picture. That’s what I’m sug-
gesting. It’s not a sustainable picture, and what Wisconsin tells 
us is that you can’t sustain a labor movement in the public sec-
tor with public employees, essentially a set of islands in a non-
union sea. That’s what Wisconsin suggests.  
And the political consequences of the steady disorganiza-
tion of working people are registering in the states in a second 
way, and that’s in “right to work” legislation. So, of course, you 
Fig. 5 Used with permission from the AFL-CIO Center for Strategic Research. 
 
 all know private sector labor relations largely are governed by 
federal law—the National Labor Relations Act, but in 1947,  in 
the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress created a somewhat peculiar 
one-way exception to the preemptive sweep of federal law in 
Section 14(b), allowing the states to adopt so-called “right to 
work” laws.  
Now, going back to 1935, the primary innovation of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act was the principle of exclusivity, that 
is the majority rule. It’s like our democracy generally. You have 
a vote and the majority governs, and the selected representa-
tive represents everybody, union and nonunion employees 
alike. And that, too, has consequences. That is, the union that’s 
elected to represent all employees has a legal duty to do so and 
a legal duty to do so which extends to both union members and 
nonmembers.  
In 1944, interestingly, twenty years before Congress pro-
hibited employers from discriminating on the basis of race, the 
Supreme Court held, and I quote, that a union “representative 
is clothed with power, not unlike that of a legislature,” and 
thus has the duty “to represent nonunion or minority union 
members . . . without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, 
and in good faith.” In other words, the union can’t discriminate 
based on union membership or other improper reasons.  
When Congress amended the NLRA in 1947, it not only in-
troduced Section 14(b), but it recognized that duty by indicating 
that a union and an employer could agree to a provision in their 
contract which spreads the cost of that representation by allow-
ing the union to charge all employees for their representation, 
all members and nonmembers for that representation. The Su-
preme Court has since held that that charge is limited to the 
cost of representation. That is, the collective bargaining agree-
ment cannot require union membership, the union cannot 
charge full union dues to nonmembers, but the agreement can 
spread the cost of representation across all employees, and the 
court has explained that that arrangement distributes fairly 
the cost among those who benefit, and it counteracts the incen-
tive that employees might otherwise have to become free riders 
who refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining the bene-
fits of union representation.  
Yet it’s important to recognize that you have both of those 
happening in the 1947 amendments. The 1947 amendments, at 
the same time they recognized there was a free rider problem 
and the cost of union representation should be shared because 
of the union’s duty of fair representation, Congress essentially 
ripped the uniform fabric of federal labor law by allowing the 
states to adopt “right to work” laws. Of course, such laws don’t 
create a right to work. Nonunion employees have no such right. 
They can be fired at will, they can have their wages reduced at 
the will of the employer, reduced by amounts much greater 
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than any union dues or fees would reduce them. Rather, “right 
to work” laws simply prevent unions from entering into agree-
ments with employers that spread the cost of representation 
across all represented employees. Twenty-four states have 
adopted “right to work” laws. Most of them did so immediately 
before or immediately after Taft-Hartley.  
So what we have here is far from cooperative federalism. 
I’d call it combative federalism. That is, we have states adopt-
ing laws that are fundamentally inconsistent with federal labor 
law. The Supreme Court, in fact, has said that in “right to 
work” states, “There is [thus] a conflict between state and fed-
eral law; but [it is] a conflict sanctioned by Congress . . . .” So 
what’s the core of that conflict?  
The core of the conflict, of course, is that the union has the 
duty to represent everyone, but it can’t spread the cost to eve-
ryone. And it has the duty to represent everyone not only in 
negotiations but in relation to individual grievances. A union 
member gets fired or a nonunion member gets fired, the union 
has the duty to represent that person, and the National Labor 
Relations Board has held that that duty is compromised if the 
union attempts to charge the individual for that representation 
outside of collection of a fair share fee, which is outlawed in 
“right to work” states. So it’s no different from requiring an in-
surance company to provide benefits to everyone in a group, 
whether they pay for them or not.  
You may have read that a state court trial judge in Indiana 
recently held that the “right to work” law adopted in that state 
violated the state constitutional provision against taking of 
services without compensation. Now, there’s some fairly com-
plicated preemption questions in that case, which will be re-
solved on appeal, but, in essence, that’s correct. It’s a taking of 
services without just compensation. So the result is that the 
central right guaranteed by federal labor law, the right to rep-
resentatives of one’s own choosing, is compromised because un-
ion members have to pay not only for their own representation 
but also for others’, and the economic viability of representation 
is compromised.  
Now, what’s the relationship of this to the whole picture? 
The relationship is this. As I indicated, most “right to work” 
laws that were adopted in the states were adopted either just 
before or just after 1947, and, then again, like the public-sector 
map, the map basically remained the same until the last few 
years. In 2011, Indiana adopted a “right to work” law, and in 
 2012 Michigan adopted a “right to work” law. And, again, the 
explanation of why those laws are being passed has everything 
to do with the whole picture.  
In Michigan, as late as 1979, unions represented close to 
40% of all employees. In 2012, when Michigan adopted a “right 
to work” law under Section 14(b), unions represented barely 
17%. So the loss of union membership is leading to dramatic 
changes in the legislative arena at the state level, changes 
clearly designed to weaken labor organizations both in the pub-
lic and private sectors.  
At the federal level, of course, we have the opposite. That 
is, labor law has been marked not by change but by stasis—it 
has remained the same. But that also is important politically, 
and that also I think is explained by this same picture, because 
labor law, to be effective, to continue to serve the policies for 
which it’s adopted, has to change. It has to change in order to 
continue to serve its purposes, but our law has not changed. 
Adopted in 1935, it was significantly amended in 1947 and 
1959, but not in a way, in either case, intended to strengthen 
labor organizations, and again in 1974, but simply to extend 
the law to nonprofit hospitals, not to change its basic terms.  
But to be effective, the law has to change, and it has to 
change for two reasons. One, as we all know from our adminis-
trative law courses, parties will adapt their behavior to the law, 
and that’s particularly true of well-counseled and wealthy par-
ties. Here you have a law, the National Labor Relations Act, 
which was expressly intended to rebalance the balance of power 
in the workplace. So we know what the consequences will be 
over time. That is, the parties who have the resources and the 
know-how will find the cracks in the law and they’ll widen 
them and they’ll work their way through them, and that’s what 
we’ve seen under the National Labor Relations Act. And that 
process was what was really behind the efforts at labor law re-
form under President Carter and more recently with the Em-
ployee Free Choice Act.  
Second, the law has to register changes in the economy. 
This law was enacted in 1935. It fit the economy of General Mo-
tors, but it doesn’t fit the economy of Walmart and Manpower 
and McDonald’s.  
Yet the NLRA has not been adjusted for over seventy-five 
years, and I would argue it’s not been adjusted largely because 
of a determined minority in the Senate. You can look at three 
instances to understand that. The first major effort at labor law 
reform during this period of steady decline was under President 
Carter. There was a Democratic president and Democratic ma-
jorities in both the Senate and House, yet a major effort at la-
bor law reform was blocked in the Senate by a filibuster led by 
Senator Orrin Hatch that survived a record six cloture votes. 
So a major effort at labor law reform was blocked by a minority 
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in the Senate under the Senate’s interesting rules of majoritar-
ian government.  
The same thing could be said of EFCA—the next major re-
form effort—the Employee Free Choice Act. A major effort at 
labor law reform that was mounted just before and after Presi-
dent Obama came into office. President Obama came into office, 
and for of the first two years of his administration, there were 
Democratic majorities in both chambers. But, again, the inabil-
ity to get sixty votes in the Senate, after EFCA passed in the 
House overwhelmingly, but, again, an inability to get sixty 
votes in the Senate blocked labor law reform.  
Even the current controversy about the National Labor Re-
lations Board—and I don’t want to minimize Roger’s agency 
here, given that he represents Noel Canning in its case in the 
Supreme Court. Even that I think can be understood in the 
same way.  
That is, President Obama came into office, and after some 
struggle, secures a functioning National Labor Relations Board. 
That National Labor Relations Board, which I was a member of 
for approximately two years, attempts in some modest ways to 
pull this law from 1935 into this century, and the reaction in 
the Senate is, at least within a minority in the Senate, is essen-
tially to shut the Board down. Senator Lindsey Graham, in an 
oft-quoted comment, very explicitly said, “I will continue to 
block all nominations to NLRB. Given its recent actions, the 
NLRB as inoperable could be considered progress.” So you have 
a reaction, again, it’s a Democratically controlled Senate, but a 
reaction among a minority in the Senate to some modest steps 
toward reform at an administrative level—a reaction aimed at 
shutting the agency down by blocking appointments.  
The result is that in January of 2012, President Obama is 
faced with the Board losing a quorum at the end of my service, 
and the President makes three recess appointments, and those 
are the three recess appointments now before the Supreme 
Court in Noel Canning. So it’s a major constitutional question 
involving the balance of power between the Senate and the 
President in the appointments arena, but I would say it’s no ac-
cident that it arises out of this little agency, the National Labor 
Relations Board, because it’s another instance, along with the 
two prior instances, where reform of this labor law enacted in 
1935 is being blocked by a minority in the Senate.  
So I want to end with the question of how we escape this 
dilemma. That’s what these graphs have shown, is that we 
 have a dilemma. We have a situation where the need for vigor-
ous organizations of working people is greater than it ever has 
been, greater in the economic realm, greater in the political 
realm, but as a result of the gradual dismemberment of those 
organizations, the course forward, as we see in the states in 
both the public sector and in terms of “right to work” legisla-
tion, is increasingly difficult to see. So how do we go forward? 
How do we effect that change? I want to go back for a moment 
and think about how it happened in 1935. How did the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act get passed? And the answer there I 
think is fairly obvious, and it’s strikes.  
Just prior to the passage of the NLRA in 1935, not only 
was the country in the midst of the Depression, but the country 
was gripped by an incredible strike wave. In April of 1935 
alone, 1.2 million workdays were lost to strikes, 281 strikes 
were ongoing, and 4,000 shipbuilding workers struck in New 
Jersey just before the Senate floor vote. Days before the House 
vote, 400,000 coal miners announced a strike date. So in that 
extraordinary moment, this bill basically sailed through the 
Congress, from the committee reports to presidential signature 
in less than two months, between May and July of 1935. When 
I cite that statistic to our legislative director, he wants to cry, 
given the way Congress works today. It was really extraordi-
nary in terms of the rapidity of that enactment.  
In contrast, last year just over a million workdays lost to 
strikes—fewer than in a single month in 1935 despite, of 
course, a vastly expanded workforce.  
Think about that—and maybe go back and look at what 
the Act actually says are its purposes. The Act’s purpose was 
clearly to quell that industrial unrest, one, but that was not the 
only purpose. The Act still states, “The denial by some employ-
ers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by 
some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining 
lead[] to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, 
which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or 
obstructing commerce . . . .”  
But that’s only one purpose. The Act had a second purpose 
and still has a second purpose, and it is, and I again quote, to 
redress:  
[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not 
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and 
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of own-
ership association [which] substantially burdens and affects the flow 
of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, 
by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power . . . .  
In other words, the Act was expressly intended to address 
exactly the divorce of productivity and wages and the increase 
in inequality that we all see in this country today as well as 
their broader implications.  
So juxtaposing those two original purposes, I think we can 
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at least imagine the beginnings of the answer to the dilemma, 
the political Catch-22 that we’re facing in the increased need 
for vigorous organizations of working people and their decreas-
ing numbers in the strikes that we’re currently seeing, the 
strikes that we’re seeing at McDonald’s and other fast food res-
taurants, the strikes by Walmart workers, the strikes in other 
low-wage industries. They’re a different kind of strike. They’re 
not shutting down the coal industry, they’re not shutting down 
the ports, they’re not causing the kind of industrial unrest that 
we saw in 1935.  
What they’re doing is they’re illustrating the need for this 
Act or a new act to fulfill its second purpose. That is, those 
strikes are strikes intended to illustrate, to dramatize, the need 
for workers’ organizations to address increasing inequality in 
this country, and so therein, and in the growing realization I 
think exists generally in the country. There is a disbalance, not 
only a disbalance in our economy, but a disbalance in our polit-
ical system. I see some hope for a political solution to this di-
lemma and an answer to the question of the future of workers’ 
organizations.  
Thank you. 
 
